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Abstract 
 
The 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime is a multilateral ballistic missile export regime of 
members (“Partner States”) who have pledged to strengthen international non-proliferation 
efforts through export controls. Has the MTCR succeeded in restricting ballistic missile 
proliferation? This paper seeks to answer this question, and explore if the Missile Technology 
Control Regime is in need of reform after three decades by drawing upon a compiled data set on 
all ballistic missiles possessed by the world’s nations as of May 2017. By evaluating missile 
diffusion over time on a global and regional basis, this paper concludes that the MTCR has 
succeeded in slowing down the rate of proliferation and restricting the new missile powers to 
missiles of relatively basic sophistication. However, the Missile Technology Control Regime 
must be strengthened, considering the omission of the Middle East from the Regime, the ability 
of missile transfers to catalyze domestic development, and the subversion of the MTCR by its 
own Partner States. 
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Introduction 
 
Ballistic missiles have been critical components of many nations’ military arsenals since the 
conclusion of World War II. The first conventional ballistic missile, the V-2, was developed by 
Nazi Germany in the 1930’s and 1940’s, and deployed against the Allied powers throughout 
World War II1. With the ability to strike distant targets and deliver chemical, biological, and 
nuclear payloads, ballistic missiles have long been significant to discussions of global 
geopolitical security with the capacity to wreak significant danger to strategic civilian and 
military targets. Considering this, ballistic missiles differ in regard to their technical 
specifications: range, speed, payload, propulsion and guidance systems, accuracy (measured in 
CEP), method of launch, and nuclear capability. Ballistic missile variants are understood in terms 
of these variables. Ballistic missiles are first classified by their range: Short-range (less than 
1,000 km), medium-range (1,000 - 3,000 km), intermediate-range (3,000 - 5,500 km), and 
intercontinental (more than 5,500 km)2. Most importantly, the particular technical specifications 
of a nation’s ballistic missiles are linked to the strategic nature of that nation’s arsenal. If an 
Asian-Pacific country possesses only short-range ballistic missiles, they lack the ability to order 
a missile strike across the Atlantic Ocean, for example.  
 
Ballistic missile proliferation is a critical threat to international security. As such, the United 
States and other nations have devoted significant attention and resources to anti-proliferation 
efforts. Preventing the rise of new states with ballistic missile capabilities is a complicated 
                                               
1 "V-2 Missile." National Air and Space Museum. September 06, 2017. Accessed February 07, 2018. https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-
objects/missile-surface-surface-v-2-4. 
2 Davenport, Kelsey. "Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories." Arms Control. December 2017. Accessed February 07, 2018. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles. 
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endeavor, premised on limiting the transfer of missiles, missile technology, and the financial and 
human capital (“soft technology”) necessary to successfully develop a medium-range, 
intermediate-range, or intercontinental missile. At the forefront of the international effort to limit 
missile proliferation is the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral 
export regime of members (“Partner States”) who have pledged to strengthen international non-
proliferation efforts through export controls, regular meetings, and dialogue with non-Partners. 
The MTCR is an informal political consensus or a pact, per se, as it does not impose legal 
obligations upon its Partners. Instead, member states agree to work together to limit missile 
proliferation by following the MTCR Guidelines and MTCR Annex. The Guidelines prescribe 
the common export control policy followed by MTCR Partners, while the Annex denotes the list 
of controlled items (equipment, materials, software, and technology) necessary for missile 
development, production, or operation3.  
 
This paper seeks to examine the efficacy of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime. Has 
the MTCR succeeded in restricting ballistic missile proliferation? In light of an evolving 
geopolitical landscape and the ability to aspiring proliferators to subvert export controls or seek 
alternative technologies, is the Missile Technology Control Regime in need of reform?  
 
Research Significance 
The importance of ballistic missiles to global security has gained even greater attention in the 
context of contemporary regional conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East. 
Efforts by the North Korean government to successfully develop a nuclear-capable, long-range 
                                               
3 "MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex." MTCR. September 30, 2016. Accessed February 07, 2018. 
http://mtcr.info/mtcr-guidelines/. 
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ballistic missile has stoked regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and provoked widespread 
condemnation from the West and around the world. Since late 2017, North Korea is believed to 
have tested numerous ballistic missile variants, with American intelligence officials believing 
that North Korea has successfully developed an intercontinental missile capable of striking the 
entirety of the continental United States4. The threat of North Korean missile development has 
contributed to a renewed focus on missile defense in the United States, with the deployment of 
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Korean peninsula in early 
2017 to protect South Korea proper. THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile defense system designed 
and built by Lockheed Martin and several defense contractors under the aegis of the U.S. 
military with the ability to target and neutralize short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles5. 
As of writing, the Pentagon has also successfully destroyed a mock ICBM over the Pacific 
Ocean with a ground-based interceptor missile launched on May 30, 2017 from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base in California6. In the Middle East, ballistic missiles have figured prominently in both 
the Yemeni Civil War (2015-) and Syrian Civil War (2011-), with the latter conflict involving 
the deployment and almost-depletion of Syria’s ballistic missile arsenal7,8. Lastly, a better 
understanding of the efficacy of the MTCR will determine if the 1987 export regime is indeed 
working as intended after three decades, and if not, how to best enact reforms to strengthen anti-
proliferation efforts. 
                                               
4 Cohen, Zachary, Ryan Browne, and Nicole Gaouette. "New missile test shows North Korea capable of hitting all of US mainland." CNN. 
November 30, 2017. Accessed February 07, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html. 
5 ISDP. "THAAD on the Korean Peninsula." Institute for Security and Development Policy. October 2017. Accessed February 07, 2018. 
http://isdp.eu/publication/korea-thaad/. 
6 Bendix, Aria. "U.S. Conducts Successful Missile Defense Test." The Atlantic. May 30, 2017. Accessed February 7, 2018. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/05/us-conducts-successful-missile-defense-test/528591/. 
7 Reuters Staff. "Israel says 90 pct of Syria's ballistic missiles used up on rebels." Reuters. December 18, 2015. Accessed February 7, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-missiles/israel-says-90-pct-of-syrias-ballistic-missiles-used-up-on-rebels-
idUSL8N13D4M220151118. 
8 Reuters Staff. "Yemen's Houthis fire ballistic missile toward Saudi Arabia." Reuters. January 20, 2018. Accessed February 7, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi/yemens-houthis-fire-ballistic-missile-toward-saudi-arabia-idUSKBN1F90GO. 
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Methodology 
The primary source of data for this research is a compiled data set on all ballistic missiles 
possessed by the world’s nations as of May 2017. This data set was collected by Professor 
Michael Horowitz in conjunction with a team of undergraduate researchers at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Additionally, the Missile Technology Control Regime website (MTCR.info), 
provides data on MTCR partners and when they pledged to join the regime’s anti-proliferation 
efforts. This paper analyzes the ballistic missile data set to evaluate missile diffusion over time 
on a global and regional basis to evaluate the efficacy of the MTCR. Specifically, the paper 
examines the number of new countries that have become missile states or advanced their ballistic 
missile capabilities since the launch of the MTCR in 1987. Additionally, this project takes a 
closer look at these states, reviewing relevant literature to draw conclusions and provide context 
to the acquisition or development of their ballistic missile arsenal. Lastly, this paper provides a 
holistic view of missile transfers before and after the implementation of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime using the data set. 
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Results 
 
See appendix. 
 
 
Discussion 
Overview of Ballistic Missile Diffusion Since 1987 
 
As of May 2017, there are 38 states which possess ballistic missiles. Of these states, 23 had 
ballistic missile arsenals prior to the implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
in 1987. Hence, there have been 15 “new missile powers” since 1987 which have acquired or 
developed ballistic missile capabilities. Since 1987, many of the historical ballistic missile states 
have also furthered their arsenals either through development or transfers from other states. For 
the historical states, independent domestic development is the most common method of missile 
acquisition. Considering the missile data set, approximately 73.5% of missile acquisition is 
conducted through domestic development for the historical missile states, while 26.5% of 
acquisition is attributed to missile transfers from other states. Prior to the implementation of the 
MTCR, Europe had the greatest concentration of missile powers, closely followed by the Middle 
East, Asia, Africa, and North America. 
 
The new missile powers have largely been clustered in the Middle East, which has seen the rise 
of 7 states (Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Turkey, 
and Pakistan) capable of fielding ballistic missiles in some capacity, followed by Europe with 4 
states (Armenia, Belarus, Greece, and Slovakia), Asia with 3 states (Taiwan, India, and 
Thailand), and Latin America with 1 state (Argentina). Of the new missile powers, the 
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predominant means of acquisition has been missile transfers from the old missile states, 
accounting for 53.1% of missile acquisition as compared to domestic development with or 
without foreign assistance. This number, however, is skewed by the existence of determined 
proliferators like Pakistan which have concertedly pursued independent domestic development. 
In contrast, 10 of the 15 new missile states have only gained ballistic missile capabilities due to 
transfers from the historical states alone. 
 
The states which have participated in the transfer of missiles to the new missile states include the 
United States, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, with the United States (29.4%) and Russia 
(64.7%) accounting for the greatest proportion of transfers. Of these missiles, they are 
predominantly short-range (less than 1,000km) and medium-range (1,000-3,000km). Indeed, of 
the new missile powers, only two have successfully developed intermediate-range missiles 
(3,000-5,500km): Pakistan’s Ababeel (2200 km) and India’s K-4/K-5 (3500 km). None have 
acquired or developed intercontinental (greater than 5,500km) ballistic missiles. The missile 
arsenals of the new missile powers more often than not are MTCR Category I with an initial 
inertial guidance system. 
 
 On the other hand, Pakistan, India, Taiwan, and Argentina have all succeeded in building their 
own ballistic missile arsenals through independent domestic development without foreign 
assistance or relying on a previous transfer of ballistic missile technology. Turkey, on the other 
hand, initially received a MGM-140A (ATACMS) from the United States in 1988 which began 
its journey toward domestic missile development. Its two domestically-developed missiles, the J-
600T Yildirim I and J-600T Yildirim II, were both created with Chinese assistance in 2002. 
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These domestically-developed missiles are more varying in terms of range and technical 
sophistication; for example, the range of Pakistan’s arsenal is 60 km at its lowest (Nasr) and 
2,200 km at its greatest (Ababeel). On the other hand, for the new missile powers who have only 
received missiles through transfers, the range varies from 15 km at its lowest (FROG 7 - 
Armenia) and 1,100 km at its greatest (SS25 Sickle - Belarus).   
 
Factors Mitigating MTCR Effectiveness 
Subversion by MTCR Partners 
Since 1987, the MTCR’s effectiveness has largely been hindered by its own Partners who are 
engaging in proliferative activity contrary to the stated mission of the MTCR to restrict ballistic 
missile proliferation. The United States, one of regime’s founding Partners, has perhaps been one 
of the worst offenders of the MTCR, engaging in repeated ballistic missile transfers since 1987, 
primarily in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These include ballistic missile sales to Turkey 
(1988), Thailand (1993), the United Kingdom (1994), Greece (1996), South Korea (1999), 
Bahrain (2000), and the United Arab Emirates (2011). Of these 7 missile transfers, 5 were 
MTCR Category I ballistic missiles transferred to the United Kingdom, Greece, South Korea, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. With the exception of the missiles transferred to 
Thailand and South Korea, all had inertial guidance systems involving GPS, with the United 
Kingdom by far receiving the most sophisticated ballistic missile with MK6 astro-inertial 
guidance with GPS and computer-guided target selection. Of course, not all transfers should be 
judged equally. More concern should be given to missile transfers to states with a greater 
potential to use the weapons irresponsibly. With this logic, the transfer of ballistic missiles to 
trusted American security partners in their respective regions, like South Korea in the Asia-
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Pacific and the United Kingdom in Europe, are less of a cause for concern considering that the 
chance of these states using their missiles irresponsibly is minimal. 
 
Russia, who joined the MTCR in 1995, has also subverted its MTCR obligations by transferring 
ballistic missiles to Armenia in 2016. However, what is particularly striking is the extent of 
proliferative activity Russia was engaged in prior to becoming a Partner in 1995. Between 1987 
and 1995, Russia transferred 10 ballistic missiles to a combination of historical and new missile 
states. However, after joining the MTCR in 1995, Russia’s proliferative activity essentially 
ceased until its transfer of 1 ballistic missile (SS26) to Armenia in 2016.  
 
Of the new missile states in Europe, all owe their missile acquisitions to U.S. and Russia missile 
transfers, rather than independent domestic development. Slovakia achieved a ballistic missile 
arsenal with the transfer of a SS23 Spider from Russia in 1991, as did Belarus with the receipt of 
a SS-1 Scud B, FROG-7, and SS25 Sickle from Russia. Armenia and Greece became missile 
powers due to the transfer of a SS21 Scarab, R-17 Elbrus, and FROG-7 from Russia in 1993 and 
MGM-140 from the United States in 1996, respectively. It is important to note that with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, some of the East European states inherited the weapons on their 
territory as former members of the Soviet bloc. Slovakia and Belarus’ missile acquisitions in 
1991, coinciding with the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, are likely a 
consequence of this9. 
 
                                               
9 Parker, Clifton B. "Why the Soviet nuclear arsenal stayed secure as the nation collapsed." Stanford Engineering. August 04, 2017. Accessed 
February 07, 2018. https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/why-soviet-nuclear-arsenal-stayed-secure-nation-collapsed. 
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It is possible that initial missile transfers can serve as a foundation for independent domestic 
development. Israel, Ukraine, and Libya all began down the path of proliferation through missile 
transfers from the historical missile states. Israel first received the Jericho-1 from France in 1968, 
which is subsequently used as a direct inspiration for the domestic development of the Jericho-2 
in 1986. In Ukraine, the SS-1C Scud was first acquired from the Soviet Union in 1965; in just 
five years, Ukraine then was able to pursue domestic development of the UR-100N in 1970. 
Lastly, a similar pattern emerges for Libya: the country first received the R-17 Elbrus in 1975 
and the FROG-7 in 1976 from the Soviet Union, then followed by domestic development of the 
Hwasong-6 in 1992. In all of these cases, independent domestic development was undertaken 
after precedent transfers of existing ballistic missile technology.  
 
Missile Powers outside the MTCR 
The existence of missile powers outside of the regime has also undermined the effectiveness of 
the Missile Technology Control Regime over its 30-year history. This makes sense; missile states 
who refuse to become Partners to the MTCR are free to engage in proliferative activity with 
other states non-party to the regime. The continued exclusion of China, Iran, and North Korea 
from the MTCR and Russia from 1987 to 1995 demonstrate the ability of missile powers outside 
the MTCR to subvert control efforts. China, Iran, and North Korea have all been responsible for 
missile transfers and missile development assistance, particularly in the Middle East. China, 
however, has agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, placing China both inside and outside the 
regime at the same time while its membership remains under review after applying to join the 
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MTCR in 200410. This could explain the cessation of China’s missile transfers over the last 
decade; China last sold a DF-21 in 2007 to Saudi Arabia. 
 
There is also a glaring omission of Partners from the Middle East. As of May 2017, the sole 
adherent to the MTCR from the Middle East is Turkey, which joined the regime in 1997. 13 of 
14 countries in the Middle East all possess a ballistic missile arsenal in some form but are not 
party to the MTCR: Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Pakistan. The implications of this are 
evident for restricting missile proliferation, as these nations are both free to transfer missiles both 
within and outside the Middle East. This has already been seen with Iran, who has previously 
transferred a Fateh-110 missile to Syria in 2007. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the past thirty years, the Missile Technology Control Regime has fallen short in impeding 
global ballistic missile proliferation. On an absolute basis alone, it seems that the MTCR has 
been successful: 15 states gained ballistic missile capabilities after 1987, compared to the 23 
states which possessed ballistic missiles prior to its implementation. In this, it can be claimed 
that the Missile Technology Control Regime has effectively slowed down the rate of 
proliferation. Moreover, the new missile powers, with the exception of Pakistan and India, have 
been limited to short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles of relatively basic sophistication 
(inertial guidance system with a highly variable CEP). While it is inconclusive if the MTCR 
                                               
10 Zaborsky, Victor. "Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime?" Arms Control. October 1, 2004. Accessed February 07, 
2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Zaborsky. 
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itself is directly responsible for this trend considering the existence of prevailing nation-specific 
variables, it is likely that the Regime’s presumption of denial on the export of advanced missile 
technologies has contributed to the limited capabilities of the new missile powers’ arsenals. 
 
Of the new missile powers, the predominant means of acquisition has been missile transfers from 
the historical missile states, accounting for 53.1% of missile acquisition as compared to domestic 
development, Indeed, with 10 of the 15 new missile states only gaining ballistic missile 
capabilities due to transfers from the historical states alone, it is evident that the MTCR has been 
unable to entirely prohibit ballistic missile transfers to new states. The trade in ballistic missile 
technology continues. Moreover, the arsenals of these new missile powers are largely composed 
of ballistic missiles which meet the MTCR Category I classification. This stands in contrast to 
the Regime’s strong presumption of denial on the export of these weapons. Particularly 
concerning is the subversion of the export regime by its own Partners. As discussed, the United 
States and Russia have continued to engage in the transfer of ballistic missiles since 1987. While 
the MTCR does not prohibit its Partners from engaging in missile transfers, the frequency in 
which the United States and Russia have participated in the practice undermines the integrity of 
the export regime as a voluntary, consensus-driven arrangement, and reinforces the reality that 
there are no consequences for violating the export regime.  
 
It appears that the domestic development of ballistic missile can be catalyzed by missile 
transfers. In the case of Israel, Ukraine, and Libya, independent domestic development was 
undertaken after the transfers of existing ballistic missiles. With the requisite expertise and 
technology in-hand, these states were able to achieve the capability to develop more 
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sophisticated missiles with little to no state assistance. These states illustrate how proliferation 
can be exponentiated through the simple transfer of a short-range ballistic missile to another 
state, with the understanding that these transfers can provide a platform for independent 
development.  
 
Lastly, the Missile Technology Control Regime has proven ineffective in curtailing proliferation 
in the Middle East. The region has become increasingly armed since 1987 through both domestic 
development and missile transfers, and only Turkey, out of 14 new and historical missile powers 
in the region, is party to the MTCR. This absence of MTCR adherence in the Middle East is 
perhaps one of the greatest factors undermining the effectiveness of the Regime both now and 
into the future, as the risk of both missile transfers or deployment in warfare continues to rise as 
proliferation continues.  
 
Ultimately, the inadequacy of the Missile Technology Control Regime over the past thirty years 
demonstrates that it is time to strengthen the export regime.  
 
● The subversion of the MTCR by its own Partners is a systemic weakness to the export 
control regime. As of now, there is little that can be done to enforce the Regime, 
considering that it is a voluntary arrangement among cooperative states. However, it 
would be useful to consider if it is time to move beyond a voluntary export regime to a 
treaty-based instrument, with the power to censure or sanction violators of the Regime.  
● The MTCR places a strong presumption on the denial of Category I ballistic missile 
technology. However, those Partners which choose to engage in missile transfers may 
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inadvertently be catalyzing independent missile development by recipients, as 
documented in the case of Libya, Ukraine, and Israel. Partners should be diligent about 
this possibility in determining if it should export Category I or even non-Category I 
missiles to other states. 
● The Middle East is a primary priority for integration into the export regime in order to 
stymie further proliferation in region. Working with Middle Eastern states to secure 
export control pledges and opening dialogue to integrate the region’s missile powers into 
the Regime is a necessary step to revitalizing the MTCR. 
 
While the Missile Technology Control Regime and its Partners acknowledge the impossibility of 
preventing missile proliferation entirely, it is evident that the Regime has become outdated since 
its inception three decades ago. In a geopolitical environment where ballistic missiles are more 
relevant than ever to state conflict, foreign relations, and national security strategy, anti-
proliferation efforts must be founded upon a renewed Missile Technology Control Regime. 
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Appendix 
 
Historical Missile States  
 
North America 
 
United States (1987) 
 
 
Missile Date Acquired Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category 
I? 
MGM-5 
Corporal 
1954 Domestic 48-130, 600 Telemetry, 
ground 
radar, 
doppler  
Yes 
  
PGM-11 
  Redstone 
1958 Domestic 240-320, 
140 
Inertial Yes 
SM-65 
  Atlas 
1959 Domestic 10300-
14484, 
unspecified 
Inertial/radi
o 
Yes 
PGM-19 
  Jupiter 
1960 Domestic 2980, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
MGM-31 
  Pershing 
1960 Domestic 740-1770, 
400 
Inertial with 
active radar 
(terminal) 
Yes 
UGM-27 
  Polaris 
1960 Domestic 2200-4600, 
600 
Inertial Yes 
Minuteman 
  I 
1962 Domestic 9260, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
Titan 
  I/II/III/IV 
1962 Domestic 10186-
14967, 
unspecified 
Inertial/radi
o 
Yes 
MGM-29 1962 Domestic 46-140, Inertial Yes 
 
16 
 
  Sergeant unspecified 
Minuteman 
  II 
1966 Domestic 12964, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
 
   
   
  Minuteman III 
1970 Domestic 9656, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
Poseidon 
  C3 
1971 Domestic 5280, 550 Inertial Yes 
MGM-52 
  Lance 
1972 Domestic 4.8-120, 
455 
Inertial Yes 
LGM-118A 
  Peacekeeper 
1986 Domestic 9656-
10900, 120 
Inertial Yes 
Trident 
  II D-5 
1990 Domestic 7360-
12000, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
ATACMS 
  Block 
I/IA/II/IIA/IVA 
1991 Domestic 165-300 Inertial/GPS 
with GPS 
and infrared 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Europe 
 
United Kingdom (1987) 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
PGM17 Thor 
IRBM 
1959 United States 2000-2400, 
100 
Inertial with 
active radar 
(terminal) 
Yes 
UGM27 Polaris 
1968 United States 2200-4600, 
900 
Inertial with 
active radar 
and 
Yes 
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computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Trident D-5, 
UGM 133 
1994 United States 2000-12000, 
90 
MK 6 astro-
inertial with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
France (1987) 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
S1 MRBM 1965 
Domestic N/A, 
unspecified 
N/A 
No 
S2 1965 
Domestic 3000-3500, 
unspecified 
Inertial 
No 
M1 SLBM 1971 
Domestic N/A-3008, 
unspecified 
Inertial 
Yes 
M2 SLBM 1974 
Domestic N/A-3200, 
unspecified 
Inertial 
Yes 
Pluton 
(SRBM) 1974 
Domestic 10-120, 150 Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) No 
M20 SLBM 1977 
Domestic N/A-3000, 
1000 
Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
S3 1980 
Domestic 3000-3450, 
unspecified 
Inertial 
No 
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M4A/B SLBM 1985 
Domestic 4000-6000, 
500 
N/A 
Yes 
Hades 
(SRBM) 1988 
Domestic 250-480, 100 Inertial with 
GPS, 
DSMAC, and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) No 
M45 SLBM 1996 
Domestic 4000-6000, 
350 
Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
M51 SLBM 2001 
Domestic 6000-11000, 
unspecified 
Astro-inertial 
with GPS and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
 
 
Germany (1987) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
V-2 (A-4) 1942 Domestic 300-330, 
4500 
Gyroscope / 
Leitstrahl-
Guide Beam 
Yes 
 
 
Italy (1987) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Alfa 1973 Domestic 1600, Inertial Yes 
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unspecified 
 
 
Soviet Union/Russia (1995) 
 
 
Missile Date Acquired Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category 
I? 
SS21 1962 Domestic 300, 450-900 Inertial Yes 
SS19 Stiletto 
1973 Domestic 
10000, 400 
Inertial with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
SS 18 
1979 Domestic 16000, 250-
1000 Inertial Yes 
R29 
1973 Domestic 7800-9100, 
1500 
Astro-
inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) Yes 
SS24 Scalpel 
1982 Domestic 
11000, 500 
Inertial 
autonomous Yes 
SS 25 Sickle 1988 Domestic 10500, 200 Inertial Yes 
RT2PM2 
Topol 
1997 Domestic 
11,000, 200 Inertial Yes 
R29 RMU 
Sineva 
1997 Domestic 8300-
11000, 1400 
Astro 
Inertial with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
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SS 29 / SS27 
Mod 2 
2010 Domestic 2000-
12000, 250 
Inertial/Glo
nass with 
radar and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal)  Yes 
R-29RMU2.1 
Liner 
2010 Domestic 11000, 1400 Inertial/Glo
nass with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
RSM56 
Bulava 
2011 Domestic 8000, 1400 Inertial with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) Yes 
 
 
 
Hungary (1993) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
SS-1C Scud 
B 
(R-17 Elbrus) 
1970 Russia 300, 450 Inertial Yes 
 
 
Bulgaria (1994) 
 
 
Missile Date Method of Range (km) Guidance MTCR 
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Acquired Acquisition & CEP (m) System Category I? 
SS-1C Scud 
B 
(R-17 Elbrus) 
1960 Russia 300, 450 Inertial Yes 
OTR-23 Oka 
(SS-23 
Spider) 
1986 Russia 50-500, 150 Inertial with 
DSMAC 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Romania 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
SS-1C Scud 
B 
(R-17 Elbrus) 
1965 Russia 300, 450 Inertial Yes 
FROG-7 
(9K52 Luna-
M) 
1982 Russia 15-70, 700 Unguided No 
 
 
Ukraine (1998) 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
SS-1C Scud 
B 
(R-17 Elbrus) 
1965 Russia 300, 450 Inertial Yes 
UR-100N        
(SS-19) 
1970 Domestic 10,000, 920 Inertial Yes 
OTR-21 
Tochka        
(SS-21 
Scarab) 
1976 Russia 70-185, 70 Inertial No 
RT-23        1980 Domestic 10,000 - Inertial Yes 
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(SS-24 
Scalpel) 
11,000, 500 
 
 
Asia Pacific 
 
South Korea (2001) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Hyonmu 
1/2/2A/2B 
1987 Domestic 180-250, 
unspecified 
GPS/INS No 
MGM-140B 
ATACMS 
1999 United States 165, 50 Inertial Yes 
 
 
China 
 
 
Missile Date Acquired Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category 
I? 
DF-3/3A (CSS-2) 
1966 Domestic 2400-400, 
unspecified 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-4 (CSS-3) 
1970 Domestic 4500-5500, 
1400-3500 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 
1) 1980 
Domestic 10000-
12000, 500-
3500 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
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JL-1/1A (CSS-
N(X)-3) 1983 
Domestic 1000-2150, 
300-400 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-21 (CSS-5 
Mod 1) 1985 
Domestic 1750-2150, 
700 
Active radar 
and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
M-7/8610 (CSS-8) 1988 
Domestic 150-180, 
300 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-11 (M-11) 
(CSS-7 Mod 1) 1988 
Domestic 280-350, 
500-600 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-15 (M-9) 
(CSS-6 
(presumably Mod 
1) 1990 
Domestic 600, 300 Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-15A (CSS-6 
Mod 2) 1996 
Domestic 80-1000, 
30-45 
GPS, semi-
active radar, 
and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-31 (CSS-10 
Mod 1) 1996 
Domestic 3000-8000, 
150-500 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
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DF-21A and DF-
21E (CSS-5 Mods 
2 and Mod 6, 
respectively.) 1996 
Domestic 1750-2500, 
50 
GPS, active 
radar, and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-11A (CSS-4 
Mod 2) 1999 
Domestic 300-600, 
20-200 
DSMAC 
and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-16/16B (CSS-
11 Mod 1 and 
(presumably) Mod 
2) 2001 
Domestic 800-1000, 
unspecified 
GPS, semi-
active radar, 
and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-15B and DF-
15C (CSS-6 Mod 
3 and 4, 
respectively) 2006 
Domestic 600-800, 
unspecified 
GPS, active 
radar, and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-21C (CSS-5 
Mod 4 2007 
Domestic 1750-1770, 
40-50 
GPS and 
active radar 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-31A (and 31B) 
(CSS-10 Mod 2) 2007 
Domestic 11000-
12000, 300 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-5B and DF-5C 
(CSS-4 Mod 3 2008 
Domestic 13000-
15000, 500 
Computer-
guided 
target 
Yes 
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(DF-5B) and Mod 
4 (DF-5C)) 
selection 
(terminal) 
JL-2 (CSS-NX-14 
or CSS-N-5) 2009 
Domestic 2000-8000, 
150-300 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-21D (CSS-5 
Mod 5 (ASBM)) 2010 
Domestic 1400-2000, 
20-40 
GPS, 
infrared, 
active radar, 
semi-active 
radar, and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-26, DF-26B, 
and DF-26C 2012 
Domestic 3000-4000, 
100 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-41 (CSS-X-20) 2016 
Domestic 10000-
15000, 100-
500 
GPS and 
computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
DF-5A (CSS-8 2017 
Domestic 13000-
15000, 500-
800 
Computer-
guided 
target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
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RUR-5 
ASROC 
1960 United States 0.8-13, 
unspecified 
Inertial No 
 
 
Middle East 
 
Iran 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Naze’at-4 
(Mushak-
160) 
1975 Domestic 70-120, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Naze’at-6 1975 Domestic 100-105, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Naze’at-10 1975 Domestic 140-150, 7 N/A No 
Oghab 1975 Domestic 35-45, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Shahin-1 1975 Domestic 13, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Shahin-2 1975 Domestic 20, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Scud-B 
(Shahab-1 
and R-17/R-
300) 
1985 Libya and 
North Korea 
300, 450 Inertial Yes 
Tondar-69 
(CSS-8) 
1990 China 150-180, 50-
100 
Inertial No 
Scud-C 
(Shahab-2) 
1991 North Korea 500-550, 700 Inertial Yes 
Shahab-3 (No 
Dong-1) 
1993 North Korea 800-1300, 
2500 
Inertial Yes 
DF-11 (CSS-
7) 
1995 China 120-350, 600 Inertial Yes 
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Fateh-110 1996 Domestic 100-170, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Zelzal-1  1998 Domestic 125-150, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Zelzal-2 1998 Domestic 210-300, 
unspecified 
N/A Yes 
DF-15 2001 China 200-800, 280 Inertial Yes 
Fateh-100A 2002 Domestic 200-210, 
unspecified 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
No 
Modified 
Shahab-3 
(Ghadr-1) 
2004 Domestic 1000-2500, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
SS-N-6 (BM-
25 Musudan) 
2006 North Korea 2500-4000, 
1600 
Inertial Yes 
Zelzal-3 2007 Domestic 150-400, 
unspecified 
N/A Yes 
Zelza-3B 2007 Domestic 200-260, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Fateh-3  2010 Domestic 250, 250 Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Yemen 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B (R-17 
Elbrus) 
1990 Yemeni 
Unification 
190-550, 450 Inertial Yes 
FROG-7 1990 Yemeni 12-68, 400- N/A No 
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(9K52 Luna-
M) 
Unification 700 
SS21 Scarab 
(OTR 21 
Tochka) 
1990 Yemeni 
Unification 
70-185, 95-
160 
Inertial with 
GPS(terminal
) 
No 
Scud Mod-C 
(Hwasong-6) 
2001 North Korea 575-600, 700 Inertial Yes 
 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
DF-3 (CSS-2) 1987 China 2500-3500, 
1000-4000 
Inertial Yes 
DF-21 (CSS-
5) 
2007 China 500-2150, 
300-700 
Inertial with 
active radar 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Egypt 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
al-Zafir 1962 Domestic 350-430, 
1600 
Inertial Yes 
al Kahir 1962 Domestic 8-600, 1600 Inertial Yes 
FROG-7B 
(R-70 Luna-
M) 
1968 Russia 70, 500-700 N/A No 
Scud-B 1973 Russia 280-300, 400 Inertial Yes 
Sakr-80 1987 Domestic 80, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
 
29 
 
Scud-C 
(Hwasong-6) 
1996 Domestic 500-600, 700 Inertial Yes 
Project T 
(Scud-B-100) 
1996 Domestic 
with North 
Korean 
assistance 
450, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
 
 
Syria 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
FROG-7 
(9K52 Luna-
M) 
1970 Russia 15-70, 400-
700 
Inertial No 
Scud-B (R-17 
Elbrus)  
1973 Russia 300-450, 450 Inertial Yes 
SS-21 Scarab 
(OTR-21 
Tochka) 
1983 Russia 70-120, 95-
160 
Inertial with 
GPS and 
active radar 
(terminal) 
No 
Scud Mod-C 
(Hwasong-6) 
1990 North Korea 500-600, 700-
1000 
Inertial Yes 
Scud-D 
(Hwasong-7) 
2000 North Korea 700-995, 50-
190 
Inertial with 
DSMAC 
(terminal) 
Yes 
Fateh-110 
(M-600) 
2007 Iran 200-300, 100 Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
 
Israel 
 
 
Missile Date Method of Range (km) Guidance MTCR 
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Acquired Acquisition & CEP (m) System Category I? 
Jericho-
1(YA-1) 
1968 France 420-750, 
1000 
Inertial Yes 
MGM-52 
Lance 
1975 United States 4.8-130, 455 Inertial No 
Jericho-2 
(YA-2) 
1986 Domestic 800-3500, 
1000 
Inertial Yes 
Jericho-3 
(YA-3) 
2008 Domestic 4800-6500, 
1000 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Iraq 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B (R-17 
Elbrus) 
1975 Soviet Union 300, 450-
1000 
Inertial Yes 
Al-Hussein 1988 Domestic 600-650, 
1600-3200 
Inertial No 
Al-Samoud II 2000 Domestic 150-183, 
unspecified 
Inertial No 
 
 
Africa 
 
South Africa (1995) 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
RSA-2 1984 Domestic 1100, 1000 Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
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RSA-2 1986 Domestic 1900, 1000 Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
RSA-3 1989 Domestic 1450-1800, 
1000 
Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
No 
 
 
Libya 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
R-17 Elbrus 
(Scud-B) 
1975 Soviet Union 300, 900-
1000 
Inertial No 
FROG-7 
(9K52 Luna-
M) 
1976 Soviet Union 68-70, 500-
700 
N/A No 
Scud-B (R-17 
Elbrus) 
1976 Soviet Union 300, 900-
1000 
Inertial Yes 
Hwasong-6 
(Scud-B) 
1992 Domestic  500, 900 Inertial No 
Scud-C 
(Hwasong-6) 
1999 North Korea 500-600, 700-
1000 
Inertial Yes 
 
 
New Missile States  
 
Europe 
 
Armenia 
 
 
Missile Date Method of Range (km) Guidance MTCR 
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Acquired Acquisition & CEP (m) System Category I? 
FROG 7 
(9K52 Luna-
M) 
1993 Russia 15-65, 400-
700 
N/A No 
R-17 Elbrus 
(SS-1C Scud-
B) 
1993 Russia 50-300, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
SS21 Scarab 
(OTR21 
Tochka) 
1993 Russia 15-120, 95-
160 
Inertial with 
GPS, 
infrared, and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
No 
SS26 
(Iskander) 
2016 Russia 50-500, 7 Inertial/GPS/
GLONASS 
with GPS, 
infrared, and 
computed-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Belarus 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
SS-1 Scud-B 1991 Russia 300, 900 Inertial with 
GPS and 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
FROG-7 
(9K52 Luna 
M) 
1991 Russia 15-65, 400-
700 
N/A No 
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SS25 Sickle 
(RT-2PM 
Topol) 
1991 Russia 1100, 900 Inertial with 
computer-
guided target 
selection 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Greece (1992) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
MGM-140 
(ATACMS) 
1996 United States 128-300, 
unspecified 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Slovakia 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
SS23 Spider 
(OTR 23 
Oka) 
1991 Russia 50-480, 30-
150 
Inertial Yes 
 
 
Latin America 
 
Argentina (1993) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Alacran 1989 Domestic 200, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
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Asia-Pacific 
 
Taiwan 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Tien Chi 
I/II/IIA 
1997 Domestic 5-125, 
unspecified 
GPS No 
 
 
India (2016) 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Prithvi 1/2/3 1994 Domestic 40-150, 50 Inertial Yes 
Dhanush 2010 Domestic 250-400, 50 Inertial or 
GPS 
Yes 
Agni 
1/2/3/4/5/6 
2004 Domestic 1250, 25 Inertial Yes 
K-4/K-5 2017 Domestic 3500, 
unspecified 
Ring laser 
gyro 
Yes 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
RUM-139 
(VL-ASROC) 
1993 United States 22-28, 
unspecified 
Inertial No 
 
 
Middle East 
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Afghanistan 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B 1988 Russia 300, 450 Inertial/gyros
cope 
Yes 
 
 
Turkmenistan 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B 1991 Russia 300, 450 Inertial/gyros
cope 
Yes 
 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B 1991 Russia 300, 450 Inertial/gyros
cope 
Yes 
 
 
United Arab Emirates 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Scud-B (R-17 
Elbrus) 
1989 North Korea 190-550, 450 Inertial Yes 
MGM-140 
(ATACMS) 
2011 United States 128-300, 
unspecified 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
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Bahrain 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m0 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
MGM-140 
(ATACMS) 
2000 United States 128-300, 
unspecified 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
 
 
Turkey (1997) 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
MGM-140A 
(ATACMS) 
1988 United States 165, 
unspecified 
Inertial with 
GPS 
(terminal) 
No 
 J-600T 
Yildirim I 
(CSS-X-11) 
2002 Domestic 
with Chinese 
assistance 
80-150, 
unspecified 
Inertial No 
J-600T 
Yildirim II 
2002 Domestic 
with Chinese 
assistance 
80-300, 
unspecified 
Inertial Yes 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
 
Missile Date 
Acquired 
Method of 
Acquisition 
Range (km) 
& CEP (m) 
Guidance 
System 
MTCR 
Category I? 
Hatf 1/1A/1B 1992 Domestic 70, 1000 N/A No 
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Shaheen 
1/2/3 
2003 Domestic 750, 200 Inertial Yes 
Ghauri/Hatf 5 2003 Domestic 1250, 2500 GPS 
(terminal) 
Yes 
Hatf-III 2004 Domestic 290, 250 Inertial Yes 
Hatf 2 2013 Domestic 180, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Nasr (Haft-9) 2013 Domestic 60, 
unspecified 
N/A No 
Ababeel 2017 Domestic 2200, 
unspecified 
N/A Yes 
 
 
 
 
